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An Enhanced Component Connection Method for Conversion of Fault Trees to 
Binary Decision Diagrams 
 
R. Remenyte-Prescott; Prof. J.D. Andrews 
 
1. Abstract 
 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is widely applied to assess the failure probability of industrial systems. 
Many computer packages are available which are based on conventional Kinetic Tree Theory 
methods. When dealing with large (possibly non-coherent) fault trees, the limitations of the technique 
in terms of accuracy of the solutions and the efficiency of the processing time becomes apparent. 
Over recent years the Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) method has been developed that solves fault 
trees and overcomes the disadvantages of the conventional FTA approach. First of all, a fault tree for 
a particular system failure mode is constructed and then converted to a BDD for analysis. This paper 
analyses alternative methods for the fault tree to BDD conversion process.  
For most fault tree to BDD conversion approaches the basic events of the fault tree are placed in an 
ordering. This can dramatically affect the size of the final BDD and the success of qualitative and 
quantitative analyses of the system. A set of rules are then applied to each gate in the fault tree to 
generate the BDD. An alternative approach can also be used, where BDD constructs for each of the 
gate types are first built and then merged to represent a parent gate. A powerful and efficient 
property, sub-node sharing, is also incorporated in the enhanced method proposed in this paper. 
Finally a combined approach is developed taking the best features of the alternative methods. The 
efficiency of the techniques is analysed and discussed.  
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2. Introduction 
 
The Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) method [1] has been introduced as a method for efficient and 
accurate fault tree analysis. This method has been shown to have advantages over the conventional 
Kinetic Tree Theory [2]. The main strength of the BDD method is the fact that top event probabilities 
can be calculated without the need to apply approximations or the need to obtain minimal cut sets as 
intermediate results. 
In the BDD method the fault tree is converted to a binary decision diagram, which represents the 
Boolean logic expression of the particular system failure mode. The method requires to set the 
variable ordering, and if it is not chosen suitably, the size of the final BDD can grow exponentially. 
The ordering rules are then applied to construct the BDD (ite method [1]). Alternative conversion 
methods are presented in this paper. These include component connection methods [3] where BDDs 
for each of the gate types are formed and then joined together according to the type of the parent gate 
in the fault tree. The basic component connection method is then enhanced by introducing a form of 
sub-node sharing and then by the development of the hybrid technique utilising the advantageous 
parts of the component connection method and the ite method. 
The efficiency of the alternative approaches is evaluated and compared with the conventional ite 
method. Three measures are applied while investigating the suitability of the different techniques. 
These measures are the final size of the resulting BDD, the number of calculations undertaken and the 
processing time.  
 3. Binary decision diagram method 
 
A BDD, shown in Figure 1, is a directed acyclic graph, where all paths through the BDD start at 
the root vertex and terminate in one of two states ± a 1-state (system failure), or a 0-state (system 
success). The BDD consists of terminal and non-terminal vertices, connected by branches. Every 
terminal vertex represents the final state of the system and every non-terminal vertex ± a basic event 
of the fault tree. By convention all left branches in the BDD are the 1-branches (component failure 
occurs), all right branches are the 0-braches (component functions successfully).  
The application of the BDD method for system reliability is based on the fact that the BDD 
encodes the logic function of the system failure in its disjoint form. In the example of a fault tree and 
its equivalent BDD shown in Figure 2 the logic function is:  
Top =a·(b + c)·(b + d) = a·b + a·c·d [1] 
ZKHUH³´UHSUHVHQWV%RROHDQRSHUDWRU25³ā´UHSUHVHQWV%RROHDQRSHUDWRU$1' 
There are two possible paths in the BDD shown in Figure 2 that terminate in a system 1 state 
(failure):  
a,b and dcba ,,, . [2] 
Each path is a combination of component states whose existence will result in system failure. Two 
cut sets can be obtained from these two paths if only the failure events are considered: 
{a,b} and {a,c,d}. [3] 
Cut sets consist only of the vertices that lie on the 1 branches from component nodes in the paths. 
The cut sets obtained in this example are minimal (they contain necessary and sufficient elements), 
because the BDD is minimal. Usually it would be necessary to develop a different form of BDD 
which encodes only the minimal cut sets [1]. 
In the BDD method the probability of system failure, SYSQ , can be expressed as the sum of the 
probabilities of the disjoint paths to a terminal 1 in the BDD. This is possible because paths through 
the BDD are mutually exclusive. The probability of system failure in the example is:   dqcqbqaqbqaqSYSQ  1 . [4] 
A number of other properties including system failure frequency and component importance 
measures can also be calculated [4]. 
 
4. Conventional conversion approach ± Rauzy (approach 1) 
 
Rauzy [1] developed a commonly used technique of constructing BDDs. This method applies an if-
then-else (ite) technique to each of the gates in the fault tree. Let f(x) be the Boolean function for the 
top event. Then the given ite structure  21,, ffXite  describes the following situation: if variable X 
occurs (fails) 1f  is considered, else 2f  is considered. 1f  and 2f  are Boolean functions, described as 
the residues of f, with 1 X  and 0 X  respectively. Therefore, if a node in the BDD encodes 
variable X, structure 1f  lies below the 1-branch and 2f  lies below the 0-branch of that node.  
While applying the ite method a variable ordering for basic events is introduced. Then according to 
the conversion rules every gate in a fault tree is converted to a BDD. The rules are: 
If J and H are two events in a fault tree already converted to BDD form and expressed as ite 
structures, i.e.  21,,ite ffXJ   and  21,,ite ggYG  , then for a gate in the fault tree for which 
these are inputs: 
x if X is before Y in the variable ordering ( YX  ) then 
J<op>G=ite(X, f1<op> G, f2<op> G) [5] 
x if YX  then 
J<op>G=ite(X, f1<op> g1, f2<op> g2) [6] 
here <op> is the Boolean operator of the gates in the fault tree. 
The ite technique is explained using the example in Figure 3. The ordering a < b < c < d < e is 
obtained by traversing the fault tree in a simple top-down left-right way. Applying the connection 
rules gives the expressions for gates G1, G2 and Top:  
 
G1 = b Â c Â d 
= ite(b,1,0) Â ite(c,1,0) Â ite(d,1,0) 
= ite(b,ite(c,1,0),0) Â ite(d,1,0) 
= ite(b,ite(c,ite(d,1,0),0),0) 
G2 = b Â e 
= ite(b,1,0) Â ite(e,1,0) 
= ite(b,ite(e,1,0),0) 
Top = a +  G1 + G2 
= ite(a,1,0) + ite(b,ite(c,ite(d,1,0),0),0) + G2  
= ite(a,1,ite(b,ite(c,ite(d,1,0),0),0)) +  
ite(b,ite(e,1,0),0) 
= ite(a,1,ite(b,ite(c,ite(d,1,ite(e,1,0)), ite(e,1,0)),0)) 
 
 The resulting BDD is also shown in Figure 3. The ite technique produces an ordered BDD, where 
the variable ordering is retained throughout the  BDD. This is observed because every step of the 
conversion process is performed taking into account the variable ordering.  
The ite method automatically uses sub-node sharing where each ite structure is stored in the 
memory only once and is reused if calculated further in the process.  
 
5. Component connection methods 
 
5.1. Basic approach (approach 2) 
 
The basic algorithm of the component connection method is explained in [3]. First of all, gates of a 
fault tree which have only basic events as inputs are considered. Every gate is expressed as a BDD 
VWUXFWXUHIRU³OR´RU³AND´JDWHW\SHs. Then the fault tree structure is ascended considering gates 
whose inputs have already been H[SUHVVHGDV%''V$%''IRU DQ ³OR´JDWHRU DQ ³AND´ JDWH
utilising simple rules of connection is created. Initially BDDs are constructed without considering the 
repetition of basic events in the fault tree. Then a simplification process for the resulting BDD is 
performed.  
The connection and simplification rules with some alternative strategies are presented in this 
section. The ordering of basic events is not required for this method, because the connection process 
can be performed without following a fixed ordering scheme. Only a selection scheme has to be set 
which will describe the way in which gate inputs are selected for the connection process. 
The connection rules are presented below: 
1. For a fault tree gate with only basic events as inputs. ,IDJDWHLVDQ³25´JDWHWKH%''QRGHV
representing its inputs are connected to each other through the 0-branches of the nodes. If a gate is 
DQ³$1'´JDWHWKH%''QRGHVDUHFRQQHFWHGWKURXJKWKH-branches of the nodes (see Figure 4(i) 
and (ii)). 
2. For a fault tree gate where the inputs are already represented as BDDs. Then the BDDs are 
merged to form a BDD of the gate output event. For the two BDDs which represent two inputs to a 
parent gate, one of them is set to be the main BDD, to which the other will be attached using a rule 
of selection. Then, if two BDDs are inputs to DQ³25´JDWH WKHsecondary BDD is connected to 
every terminal 0-QRGH RI WKH PDLQ %'' RU LI WZR %''V DUH LQSXWV WR DQ ³$1'´ JDWH WKH
secondary BDD is connected to every terminal 1-node of the main BDD (see Figure 4(iii) and (iv)). 
Using this algorithm the resulting BDD can contain more than one node representing the same 
basic event on a path. In order to remove repeated events in the BDD each path featuring a repeated 
variable is simplified using one of the two rules: 
1. The first occurrence of an event in the path defines the state of the repeated variable. The node, 
that represents the second occurrence of the event, needs to be replaced by the events below it on 
either its 1 or 0 branch. The branch depends on the variable state specified by its first occurrence 
in the path. For example, if the path passes through the 0-branch of a repeated node, the second 
appearance of that event should be removed replacing it by the BDD structure below the 0-branch 
of this second node.  
2. If the BDD structures below the 1 and 0 branches of any node are identical, this node is irrelevant 
and needs to be replaced by the structure below either one of the branches. In other words, if the 
state of the system does not depend on the occurrence of the basic event, the insignificant node 
must be removed. 
 
This method has been applied to the fault tree illustrated in Figure 3 resulting in the BDD shown in 
Figure 5. In this example the fault tree is traversed in the bottom-up manner when constructing a 
BDD for every gate. The variables are considered in a left-right variable ordering. The left-most BDD 
input for any gate is set to be the main BDD to which the others are joined.  
The conversion process starts constructing two BDDs for gates G1 and G2, shown in Figure 5(i) 
and Figure 5(ii) respectively. Gates G1 and GDUH³$1'´JDWHVWKHUHIRUHWKHUHVXOWLQJ%''VDUH
³$1'´FKDLQV 
Then the top event of the fault tree is considered. The left-most BDD, which represents basic event 
a, is selected to be the main BDD. Then the two BDDs from Figure 5(i) and 5(ii) are connected one 
E\RQHWRWKHEUDQFKRIWKHPDLQ%''EHFDXVHWKHWRSJDWHLVDQ³25´JDWH7KHILUVWFRQQHFWLRQ
results in the BDD in Figure 5(iii). The BDD after the second connection is presented in Figure 5(iv). 
Since there are some repeated events in the final BDD (Figure 5(iv)) the simplification rules are 
applied. Only one event, b, is repeated, therefore, its repetitions need to be removed from three 
current paths. In the first path F1-F2-F5-F6 node F5 is replaced by the terminal 0-node. This 
simplification rule is applied because this path traverses the 0-branch of node F2, the first occurrence 
of the repeated event. In the second path F1-F2-F3-F7-F8 the repeated event b is removed, replacing 
node F7 by node F8. In the same way node F9 is replaced by node F10 in the third path F1-F2-F3-
F4-F9-F10. The final BDD is shown in Figure 5(v). 
While developing this example no global variable ordering system was used and the basic events 
were connected according to the order that they appear in the list of gate inputs. However, it is 
possible to apply a defined ordering scheme for basic events. A number of structural and weighted 
ordering schemes [5] can be used. The chosen ordering scheme can influence the efficiency of the 
conversion process.  
Using a variable ordering sets the order in which basic events are considered for gates which only 
IHDWXUH EDVLF HYHQW LQSXWV ZKLFK DUH WKHQ SODFHG LQ DQ ³25´ FKDLQ RU DQ ³$1'´ FKDLQ GHSHQGHQW
upon the gate type. When gates are encountered where their inputs have been previously generated it 
has to be determined how the BDDs will be connected.  
During the connection process BDDs were previously selected according to the order that gate 
inputs are listed, i.e. the BDD, presenting the left-most gate, is set to be the main BDD. Other 
selection schemes can be used which can result in a smaller BDD and/or in a shorter processing time. 
Where a global variable ordering scheme is used BDDs can be ordered according to the position of 
their root vertex in the ordering scheme of basic events. Alternatively selecting according to the 
smallest number of available branches where connections will be made can offer an advantage in 
efficiency. Then the efficiency of different strategies can be analysed over a library of different fault 
tree structures. 
The component connection method does not require the introduction of a variable ordering in the 
conversion process. Therefore, even if the variable ordering is assigned at the start, it is not retained 
when merging two BDDs. The resulting BDD is not an ordered BDD as it is if obtained using the 
conventional ite approach but it still retains the disjoint path property and can be used for the 
quantitative analysis. 
The most significant disadvantage of the basic component connection method is that it does not 
use sub-node sharing and this can lead to inefficient memory usage. For example, in Figure 5(v) there 
are two identical nodes F8 and F10, which are shared in the BDD obtained using the ite technique 
(Figure 3). Therefore, a form of sub-node sharing is introduced as an extension to the component 
connection method. 
 
5.2. Sub-node sharing (approach 3) 
  
The sub-node sharing is used in the conventional ite technique and provides a significant 
contribution towards the efficiency of the approach. This property can also be implemented to an 
extent in the component connection method while two BDDs are connected. Consider for example, 
PHUJLQJWZRLQSXWVIRUDQ³25´JDWHDVLWLVVKRZQLQ)LJXUH 
In this example the two BDDs are independent (have no nodes in common), the left BDD is set to 
be the main BDD. It has two available connection points, i.e. two terminal 0-vertices. They can be 
connected to the same second BDD. This merging is always suitable since no repeated events appear 
in the BDDs.  
The conversion method of a fault tree to a BDD starts considering those gates which have only 
basic events as inputs and applying the first connection rule, presented in the previous section. Sub-
node sharing is applied while performing the second rule and connecting previously formed BDDs 
for gate inputs. In this case, when the BDDs contain repeated events the state of each repeated event 
needs to be considered. During the connection process the secondary BDD can be connected to all 
appropriate terminal nodes if the path from the root vertex to those terminal nodes has each repeated 
event in the same state. In other words, the sub-node sharing can be applied if while descending the 
BDD from the root vertex the same branches (1-branches or 0-branches) of repeated events were 
traversed. Otherwise, a new copy of the secondary BDD needs to be used. 
The sub-node sharing rule is:  
If two paths to terminal vertices (terminal 1-nodes for BDDs being inputs to an AND gate and 
terminal 0-nodes for BDDs being inputs to an OR gate) fall below the same branches of the repeated 
events, the same second BDD can be connected to both of the two terminal nodes.  
Consider the example from Figure 5, during the last connection of the two BDDs in Figure 5(ii) 
and in Figure 5(iii), the BDD in 5(iii) is set to be the main BDD and that of Figure 5(ii) the secondary 
BDD. Since these two BDDs have event b in common and represent two gate inputs to an OR gate 
the paths from the root vertex to the three terminal 0-nodes of the main BDD are investigated. There 
is only one repeated event b in the fault tree. The first path passes the 0-branch of node b, the second 
and the third paths pass the 1-branch of node b. The second and the third terminal nodes can be 
replaced by the same copy of the secondary BDD because the second and the third paths fix the same 
state for the basic event on the repeated node. The final BDD is shown in Figure 7(i) and 7(ii), after 
the connection and after the simplification processes respectively.   
The resulting BDD in Figure 7(ii) matches the one obtained using the ite technique, Figure 3. 
It is important to note that when applying the sub-node sharing in the component connection 
method all repeated events in the system must to be considered, not only those between the two 
BDDs under the current connection.   
 
5.3. Hybrid approach (approach 4) 
 
This method is introduced to utilise the efficient parts of the two algorithms presented ± the ite 
technique and the component connection method. It is clear, that: 
i) using the gate constructs for basic events and branches without repeated events BDDs can be 
immediately formulated without any of processing required by the ite method. 
ii) the sub-node sharing feature of the ite method provides a more efficient representation of the 
logic function than its equivalent introduced in the component connection method. 
Therefore, a new method has been created based on the effective features of each approach to 
obtain the best efficiency for BDD conversion.  
As was described before, the variable ordering is not required for the component connection 
method. However, since the hybrid approach also utilises the ite method a variable ordering needs to 
be introduced. The method then produces ordered BDDs. 
While converting a fault tree to a BDD using the hybrid method, a variable ordering needs to be 
established. Then the building of BDDs for gates containing event inputs only starts, where events are 
put in a chain according to the type of the gate (the component connection approach). This 
construction process can be applied regardless of the number of events into a gate without breaking 
them down into pairs. In comparison, the rules in the ite technique deal only with two ite structures at 
once, therefore each gate needs to be preprocessed. The variable ordering needs to be retained while 
putting basic events in a chain. The comparison of the component connection method and its 
application in the hybrid method is shown in Figure 8. 
Further while building a BDD for a gate, when gate inputs are already represented as BDDs and 
they do not contain any repeated events, the straightforward connection can be also applied. In this 
case the variable ordering needs to be applied, i.e. tho BDDs can be merged if all the events of the 
main BDD stand before the events of the secondary BDD in the variable ordering. This rule is shown 
in Figure 9. 
Finally, while building a BDD for a gate, when inputs are converted to BDDs and they contain 
repeated events, the ite technique rules are applied.  
 
For example, if we are applying the hybrid method for the conversion of a fault tree in Figure 3, 
BDDs for gates G1 and G2 are created using the component connection method, i.e. placing its basic 
HYHQWV LQ ³25´ FKDLQV DV LW ZDV VKRZQ LQ )LJXUH L and (ii). Then the two BDDs are merged 
applying the ite rules, given in equations 5 and 6. 
 
6. Comparison of the methods 
 
The efficiency of each of the methods in the conversion of a fault tree to a BDD depends on the 
structure of the fault tree. An indication of any advantages of different conversion techniques would 
need to be determined experimentally and measured over a large range of problems. The four 
approaches presented in this paper were analysed using a set of 11 fault trees from a benchmark set 
[6]. Their complexity is indicated in Table 1.  
This table describes the complexity of the fault tree in terms of the number of gates, the number of 
basic events, the number of repeated events and the number of minimal cut sets. In order to obtain a 
consistent comparison of the four techniques the variable ordering was applied not only for the 
conventional method but also for the component connection method, i.e. even when it is not needed. 
The depth-first ordering scheme was applied [5]. In this ordering the left-most gate is always 
explored completely before considering the remaining gate inputs. The basic events with the greatest 
number of occurrences are ordered first.  
The comparison of the four methods was performed by considering the following measurements:  
x the number of nodes in the final BDD,  
x the maximum number of lines in the storage array (representing the number of intermediate 
calculations performed), and  
x the processing time.  
The results of the three measurements obtained by applying the four methods to the example fault 
trees are shown in Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4. For the analysis a computer with the 2.16 GHz 
processor was used.  
Remark. Fault trees were simplified [7] prior to BDD conversion process. The simplification 
process contains the reduction [8] and modularisation [9] techniques. It allows a more efficient 
analysis of fault trees. The time taken to perform the simplification process has been included in the 
processing time in Table 4.   
 
The conventional BDD conversion technique (the ite method) resulted in smaller BDDs and 
smaller number of lines in the storage array for all the example fault trees than the basic component 
connection method. The processing time was also shorter than in the basic component connection 
method. More results for the basic approach of the component connection method are presented in 
[10].  
When sub-node sharing was introduced in the component connection approach the resulting BDDs 
were smaller than using the basic component connection method but still larger than from the ite 
technique. Calculation time slightly decreased for the majority of example fault trees. Only for those 
fault trees with a large number of intermediate calculations (examples 3 and 4) the calculation time 
increased, due to an extra time taken while identifying parts in the BDD suitable for the sub-node 
sharing. Therefore, the total time increased when the sub-node sharing was used. More results on the 
sub-node sharing method were shown in [11]. 
The hybrid method resulted in BDDs that contain the same number of nodes as the ite approach. 
Calculation time also remained very similar for all example fault trees. However, the hybrid 
technique gave slightly better results in terms of the number of lines in the storage array, except 
example 4. The slightly improved efficiency was due to the fact that the hybrid method used the best 
rules of the two techniques. Firstly, it was improved because the hybrid method provided the 
capability to obtain the BDDs for gates with event inputs only in a straightforward way, i.e. putting 
inputs of a gate in a chain one by one. Secondly, more complex parts of the fault tree were converted 
to the BDD using the component connection method if repeated events did not appear.  
Summarising it is clear that the ite technique performs better than the basic component connection 
method. However, the hybrid method, as a combination of the two methods, can provide the 
efficiency which is as good as the one of the ite method. Despite the fact that the hybrid method is 
more complex than the ite technique, according to the efficiency analysis the hybrid method is a good 
alternative technique for constructing BDDs.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Four methods of constructing BDDs from fault trees were presented in this paper. The first 
approach is the conventional ite technique. The second approach is the basic component connection 
method. The third approach investigated enhances the basic component connection method by 
developing a sub-node sharing property. The last method, the hybrid method, utilises the more 
efficient features of the two basic methods. Some example fault trees were used in order to evaluate 
the efficiency of the four methods. Three efficiency measures were considered ± number of nodes in 
the final BDD, number of nodes in the storage array and calculation time. It was shown that the ite 
method performs well, whereas the basic component connection method does not provide a good 
efficiency even if the sub-node sharing is used. When the efficiency of the two techniques was 
combined and the hybrid method was applied, the efficiency of the conversion method was slightly 
improved. Therefore, the hybrid can be used as an alternative approach to the ite technique for 
conversion of fault trees to BDDs.  
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